Nuclear technology
Nuclear energy in India: SMRs, the Nuclear Energy Mission and the SHANTI Act
Builds on: Reactor technologies, The three-stage programme and Fuel resources and reactors.
In a nutshell
Nuclear power offers India firm, low-carbon electricity that can complement solar and wind, but it supplies only about 3% of the country's electricity because plants are costly, slow to build and limited by fuel and institutions. The Nuclear Energy Mission aims for 100 GW by 2047, through more large reactors, small modular reactors and wider participation enabled by the SHANTI Act, 2025.
8.78 GW (2026)about 22 GW (2031–32)100 GW (2047)
"Government sets out roadmap to 100 GW of nuclear power by 2047" · "Draft SHANTI rules open nuclear power to private operators" (2026)
Nuclear power supplies only about 3% of India's electricity. Why so little, and can the new mission and law change that?
Why is nuclear energy important for India?
India's electricity demand is rising with economic growth, industrialisation, urbanisation and household consumption. At the same time, India must cut carbon emissions and move towards a low-carbon energy system. Coal plants provide continuous, controllable supply but emit large amounts of carbon dioxide and other pollutants. Solar and wind burn no fuel, but their output varies with sunlight and wind. Can nuclear energy reduce dependence on coal while keeping supply reliable?
| Advantage | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Low-carbon electricity | Fission burns no fossil fuel; life-cycle emissions are comparable to wind and hydro |
| Reliable, round-the-clock supply | Reactors run continuously for long periods, apart from maintenance and refuelling |
| High capacity factor | A nuclear plant typically generates at over 80% of its capacity across a year, against roughly 20% for solar, so each GW installed yields far more electricity |
| Energy security | Reduces dependence on coal and gas, although nuclear fuel supply must itself be secured (see Fuel resources and reactors) |
| Small land footprint | A compact site produces a large amount of electricity |
| Industrial uses | With suitable designs, nuclear plants can supply heat for industrial processes and hydrogen production as well as electricity |
Nuclear and renewable energy need not be rivals. Solar and wind are increasingly cheap, but their variable output creates a need for storage, transmission and dependable sources of supply. Nuclear can provide firm low-carbon electricity alongside them. It is best understood as one part of a diversified low-carbon system, not a complete replacement for coal, solar or wind.
Where India stands
Official position reported in July 2026; capacity excludes the long-shut RAPS-1.
India has mastered indigenous PHWR technology and runs several reactor designs, yet nuclear power still supplies a small share of its electricity. Why has it not expanded faster?
Challenges in expanding nuclear power
- High initial investment. Reactor components, containment, safety systems, radiation protection and long regulatory processes are expensive, and most of the money is spent before the plant generates any electricity. Long construction periods therefore add heavily to financing costs.
- Long construction and cost overruns. Large reactors are complex, one-off projects. Delays in equipment supply, clearances or financing raise costs sharply. This is why nuclear electricity can be expensive even though fuel is a small share of its generating cost. The PFBR took about 22 years from start of construction to criticality.
- Fuel availability. India's programme was long constrained by limited uranium and by international restrictions. Imports became possible only after the Nuclear Suppliers Group's 2008 waiver for India. The three-stage programme addresses the resource problem, but its later stages need further development.
- Safety, waste and public acceptance. Accidents are rare but serious. Concerns about land acquisition, evacuation planning, environmental effects and waste influence where and how fast plants are built.
The challenge is not just to build more reactors, but to expand while keeping safety, cost and public confidence intact.
Small modular reactors: can nuclear power be made more flexible?
One response to the cost and delay of large plants is to build smaller reactors that can be manufactured and deployed more flexibly. These are small modular reactors (SMRs). In the IAEA's commonly used classification, an SMR has an electrical output of up to 300 MWe per module. The name has two parts:
- Small: each reactor produces less electricity than a conventional large reactor (often 1,000 MWe or more).
- Modular: major components are manufactured as modules in factories and assembled on site.
| Conventional large reactor | Modular approach | |
|---|---|---|
| Where it is built | Mostly at the site, as a large one-off project | Modules made in factories, assembled at the site |
| Investment | Very high, all before first power | Smaller per unit; capacity can be added in stages |
| What it aims for | Economies of scale | Economies of standardised, repeated manufacture |
Why large reactors are built in series. Conventional reactors rely on economies of scale. The first unit at a site carries the heavy fixed costs: land, approvals, site infrastructure, design and supply chains. Later identical units at the same site are cheaper and quicker, which is why India builds its 700 MWe PHWRs in "fleet mode" and Kudankulam in pairs (units 3–6). The catch is that the full benefit comes only after a long, expensive first unit. SMRs try a different route: economies of series manufacture, making many identical small modules in a factory, so that cost falls with the number built rather than the size of each reactor.
Factory manufacture can reduce on-site work and allow capacity to be added module by module. But SMRs are not automatically cheaper or safer just because they are smaller. Their real performance depends on the design, the scale of manufacturing, regulatory approval and operating experience, and few have yet been built anywhere.
Are all SMRs alike? No. "SMR" describes a size and a way of building, not one technology. Some are based on established water-cooled reactors; others use advanced coolants. An SMR is not automatically a fast reactor, a sodium-cooled reactor, a breeder or a "Generation IV" reactor.
| Potential use in India | Significance |
|---|---|
| Captive power for industry | Electricity for energy-intensive industries such as steel, chemicals and large manufacturing |
| Repurposing coal-power sites | Existing land, cooling water and grid connections at retiring coal plants could be reused |
| Remote locations | Smaller supply where a large plant is unsuitable |
| Staged expansion | Capacity added in modules rather than one very large project |
| Industrial heat and hydrogen | Some high-temperature designs can supply process heat |
These are potential applications, not a claim that SMRs are already commercially available for them.
India's three indigenous SMR designs
| Design (BARC) | Output | Technology and intended use | Status, Nov 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bharat Small Modular Reactor (BSMR-200) | 220 MWe | Pressurised water reactor; electricity, including captive industrial power and coal-site repurposing | In-principle approval; lead unit proposed at Tarapur |
| SMR-55 | 55 MWe | Smaller pressurised water reactor; industry and distributed supply | In-principle approval; lead unit proposed at Tarapur |
| High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGCR) | Up to 5 MWth | High-temperature process heat, including for hydrogen production | In-principle approval; proposed at BARC, Visakhapatnam |
MWe is electrical output; MWth is thermal (heat) output.
A reactor's thermal output is roughly three times its electrical output, because only about a third of the heat becomes electricity. So the 5 MWth HTGCR, which is meant to supply heat, cannot be compared directly with the 55 MWe SMR-55. Separately from these SMRs, India plans Bharat Small Reactors: 220 MWe PHWRs of the existing design, adapted for captive use by industry with private partners.
- Design and development: BARC with Indian manufacturers
- Demonstration reactors: engineering, construction, safety validation and operation
- Commercial deployment: captive industrial power, repurposed coal sites and other uses
The Nuclear Energy Mission provides ₹20,000 crore for SMR research, development and deployment, and targets at least five operational indigenous SMRs by 2033. Official estimates suggest about 60 to 72 months to build the demonstration reactors once financial and administrative sanctions are in place, so the target depends on timely approvals, construction, testing and licensing.
The Nuclear Energy Mission and the 100 GW roadmap
The Nuclear Energy Mission for Viksit Bharat was announced in the Union Budget 2025–26 with two headline goals: 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047, and at least five indigenous SMRs by 2033. In 2026 the Department of Atomic Energy set out how the 100 GW is meant to be reached.
| Phase | Planned capacity | How it is to be achieved |
|---|---|---|
| Up to 2031–32 | About 22 GW in total | Completing reactors already under construction or commissioning (see Fuel resources and reactors) |
| 2032–2047 | About 32 GW more through NPCIL (NPCIL total about 54 GW) | More indigenous PHWRs and large light water reactors |
| By 2047 | About 46 GW through other entities | Other central and state enterprises, private companies and joint ventures, using different technologies |
| Total by 2047 | 100 GW | Several technologies and institutional models together |
The 46 GW is not an SMR-only target. SMRs are one part of a wider expansion. The strategy has two prongs:
| Large-reactor expansion | Small-reactor development |
|---|---|
| Indigenous 700 MWe PHWRs and large reactors built with international cooperation | BSMR-200, SMR-55 and specialised designs such as the HTGCR |
| Large grid-connected stations | Captive industrial power, existing industrial and coal sites |
| Established technology | Needs demonstration, standardisation and commercial proof |
| The main source of new capacity in the nearer term | A possible additional pathway for diversified deployment |
The target is ambitious. Reaching it needs growth not only in reactor construction but in manufacturing, fuel supply, finance, skilled personnel and regulatory capacity.
Why reform the nuclear sector?
India's nuclear sector has been run almost entirely by the central government and its public-sector bodies. This built indigenous capability, especially under international restrictions. But 100 GW needs investment and industrial capacity on a much larger scale than government funding and public-sector execution alone can supply. Reforms were therefore designed to widen participation while keeping regulatory control and safeguards.
Who's who in India's nuclear sector
| Body | Role |
|---|---|
| Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), under the Prime Minister; Atomic Energy Commission | Government department and policy body for atomic energy |
| Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) | Safety regulator; statutory status under the SHANTI Act |
| Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Trombay | Research; reactor designs including the AHWR and the SMRs |
| Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), Kalpakkam | Fast reactor research; designed the PFBR |
| NPCIL | Builds and runs commercial power reactors |
| BHAVINI | Builds and runs fast breeder reactors (PFBR) |
| ASHVINI | NPCIL–NTPC joint venture (Mahi Banswara) |
| Atomic Minerals Directorate (AMD), Hyderabad | Exploration for uranium and thorium |
| Uranium Corporation of India Ltd (UCIL) | Uranium mining and milling (Jaduguda) |
| IREL (India) Ltd | Beach-sand minerals: monazite, rare earths |
| Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad | Fuel fabrication |
| Heavy Water Board | Heavy water production |
| Institute for Plasma Research, Gandhinagar | Fusion research; ITER-India |
Nuclear liability: why it matters
Suppose a nuclear plant has an accident that harms people and property. Who compensates the victims? The operator runs the plant, but its equipment may have come from many suppliers. If responsibility is uncertain, or unlimited in ways that cannot be insured, investment and equipment supply are discouraged. Yet victims must be compensated without having to prove complex technical fault. Nuclear liability law tries to balance these. Three concepts matter:
- Operator liability: the plant operator bears primary legal responsibility for nuclear damage.
- No-fault (strict) liability: victims need not prove negligence by the operator.
- Right of recourse: after paying compensation, the operator may recover money from another party, such as a supplier, in specified circumstances.
Internationally, liability is channelled to the operator, is strict, is limited in amount and time, and is backed by insurance. The Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC, 1997) adds an international compensation pool; India joined it in 2016.
India's Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act, 2010 capped operator liability at ₹1,500 crore, with the government covering damage above that. But its Section 17(b) gave the operator a right of recourse against suppliers for faulty equipment, a departure from international practice that kept foreign suppliers hesitant.
SHANTI Act, 2025
The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, 2025 provides a new legal framework for nuclear energy. It received presidential assent in December 2025 and repealed both the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the CLND Act, 2010.
| Provision | What it does |
|---|---|
| Private participation | A legal pathway for eligible private companies and joint ventures to set up and operate nuclear facilities, under licence |
| Licensing and safety authorisation | Central government licence plus safety authorisation from the regulator |
| Regulator | Gives the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) statutory status for the first time |
| Liability | Operator liability graded by the category of installation, instead of one flat cap; the government covers damage beyond the operator's limit |
| Recourse | Operator can recover from a supplier only where a written contract provides for it, or where damage results from an individual's intentional act or omission (Section 16) |
| Strategic control | Sensitive activities, such as enrichment and specified spent-fuel management, stay with the government |
Supporters say the law brings Indian practice into line with international norms and unlocks investment. Critics question whether compensation will be adequate and whether suppliers will remain accountable for safety.
Implementation status. Enacting a law and bringing it into force are different stages. The Act comes into force by government notification. The Department of Atomic Energy released draft SHANTI Rules and Regulations on 14 August 2026, with comments invited until 4 September 2026; they propose a single composite licence covering a plant's whole life and mandatory insurance for operators. As of November 2026 the final rules had not been notified, so the private-participation provisions should not be described as already operational.
Can India reach 100 GW by 2047?
India has real strengths: an established nuclear research system, indigenous PHWR technology, a fast-reactor programme now past criticality, and considerable manufacturing capacity. But going from under 10 GW to 100 GW in about two decades means adding capacity far faster than India ever has. That requires:
| Requirement | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Faster project execution | Delays raise financing costs, which dominate nuclear costs |
| Manufacturing capacity | Specialised components (pressure vessels, steam generators, fuel) must be made at scale |
| Reliable fuel supply | A tenfold fleet needs far more uranium; hence the import arrangements in Fuel resources and reactors |
| Public and private investment | The 46 GW from other entities depends on the SHANTI framework working in practice |
| SMR demonstration | SMRs must prove they can be built on time and at competitive cost |
| Strong, independent regulation | Rapid expansion must not erode safety or public confidence |
| Fuel-cycle development | Long-term use of uranium and thorium depends on reprocessing and breeders |
The question is no longer whether India can build nuclear reactors. It is whether India can build and run them at the scale, cost and pace its future electricity needs demand.
Recent developments
Draft SHANTI Rules and Regulations released for consultation
The Department of Atomic Energy published draft SHANTI Rules, 2026 and draft SHANTI Regulations, 2026 on 14 August 2026, inviting comments until 4 September 2026. They propose a single composite licence covering a nuclear plant's construction, operation and decommissioning, a time limit for licensing decisions, and mandatory insurance or financial security for operators.
Why it matters: The SHANTI Act opens nuclear power to private and joint-venture operators, but it needs these rules to work. The 46 GW expected from entities other than NPCIL depends on them.
Remember: Act passed December 2025; draft rules August 2026; final rules and commencement still awaited (Nov 2026). Draft is not final.
Source: Department of Atomic Energy, public consultation notice
BARC's small modular reactors get sites and in-principle approval
The government told Parliament that BARC's 220 MWe Bharat Small Modular Reactor (BSMR-200), the 55 MWe SMR-55 and a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor of up to 5 MWth for hydrogen production have in-principle approval for engineering and construction. Tarapur is the site for the lead BSMR-200 and SMR-55 units.
Why it matters: These are the designs meant to deliver the Nuclear Energy Mission's target of at least five indigenous SMRs by 2033.
Remember: BSMR-200 and SMR-55: pressurised water reactors, lead units at Tarapur (Maharashtra). HTGCR: up to 5 MWth, for hydrogen, at BARC Vizag.
Government sets out the roadmap to 100 GW of nuclear power
The Department of Atomic Energy told Parliament how the 100 GW target for 2047 is to be met: from 8.78 GW today to about 22 GW by 2031-32 as projects under way are completed; NPCIL then adds about 32 GW more (taking it to about 54 GW); the remaining 46 GW is to come from other public-sector companies, state governments, private firms and joint ventures.
Why it matters: It turns a headline target into a division of labour, and shows how much rests on new entrants under the SHANTI Act.
Remember: 8.78 → ~22 → 100 GW. 54 GW NPCIL; 46 GW others (not an SMR-only target).
Source: World Nuclear Association, India outlook (citing DAE reply, July 2026)
SHANTI Act, 2025 replaces India's two main nuclear laws
Parliament passed the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill in December 2025, and it received Presidential assent. It repeals the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.
Why it matters: It allows limited private participation in nuclear power under regulatory oversight, gives the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board statutory recognition, and rewrites nuclear liability. Strategic materials and spent fuel management stay under government control.
Remember: Two laws repealed: Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and CLND Act, 2010. Operator liability is now graded by reactor size; recourse against suppliers only if a written contract provides for it or the damage was intentional.
Source: PIB, 19 Dec 2025
Budget 2025-26 launches the Nuclear Energy Mission
A Nuclear Energy Mission with an outlay of Rs 20,000 crore for research and development of small modular reactors; at least five indigenously developed SMRs to be operational by 2033. The Budget also set the goal of 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047.
Why it matters: It sets the targets against which India's nuclear expansion, and the opening to private players, will be judged.
Remember: Rs 20,000 crore; 5 SMRs by 2033; 100 GW by 2047. Installed capacity in 2026: 8.78 GW.
Source: PIB, 3 Feb 2025
Last-month notes
Only what is worth keeping on your table for Prelims 2027.
Numbers
- Installed: 24 reactors, 8.78 GW (2026); about 3.1% of electricity.
- Targets: about 22 GW by 2031–32; 100 GW by 2047 (NPCIL about 54 GW, others about 46 GW).
- Nuclear Energy Mission (Budget 2025–26): ₹20,000 crore for SMRs; at least 5 indigenous SMRs by 2033.
SMRs
| Design | Output | Type / use | Site |
|---|---|---|---|
| BSMR-200 | 220 MWe | PWR; electricity | Tarapur |
| SMR-55 | 55 MWe | PWR; electricity | Tarapur |
| HTGCR | Up to 5 MWth | Gas-cooled; heat, hydrogen | BARC Vizag |
- SMR (IAEA usage): up to 300 MWe per module. MWe = electrical; MWth = thermal.
- Bharat Small Reactors: 220 MWe PHWRs for captive industrial use (different from BSMR-200).
SHANTI Act, 2025
- Repealed the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the CLND Act, 2010.
- Private and joint-venture participation under licence; enrichment and specified spent-fuel management stay with government.
- Operator liability graded by installation (CLND had a flat ₹1,500 crore cap). Supplier recourse only by written contract or for intentional acts.
- AERB made statutory. Draft Rules released 14 Aug 2026 (comments to 4 Sept 2026); not yet in force.
- India joined the CSC in 2016.
- Who runs what: NPCIL (power reactors), BHAVINI (fast breeders), UCIL (uranium mining), AMD (exploration), IREL (monazite), NFC Hyderabad (fuel), AERB (regulator).
Statements to watch for
- SMR is a size and construction approach, not a reactor technology; not every SMR is a fast or Generation IV reactor.
- A 5 MWth reactor is not comparable with a 55 MWe reactor.
- The 46 GW from "others" is not an SMR-only target.
- An enacted law is not necessarily in force; draft rules are not final rules.
Revise and apply
Activities to check your understanding, not new content. Answer first, then press Check or Show answers. Multiple-choice questions are original, in the UPSC style, not past UPSC questions. A printable workbook with all activities is on the theme page.
Type the missing words, then check.
(a) 8.78 (b) 24 (c) 3.1 (d) 22 (e) 100 (f) 54 (g) 20,000 (h) 5 (i) 300 (j) pwr (k) hydrogen (l) clnd (m) aerb (n) no
- MWe measures output; MWth measures output.
- Bharat Small Reactors are 220 MWe meant for captive industrial use.
- Under the CLND Act, Section 17(b) gave operators a right of recourse against .
- Large reactors are built in series at one site because of economies of .
- Draft SHANTI Rules propose a single licence covering a plant's whole life.
1. electrical; thermal · 2. phwrs · 3. suppliers · 4. scale · 5. composite
- High upfront cost → money spent before any power is sold → delays raise costs.
- First unit carries fixed costs → later identical units are → 700 MWe PHWRs built in mode.
- CLND Section 17(b) supplier liability → foreign suppliers stayed away → SHANTI allows recourse only by written contract or for acts.
1. interest · 2. cheaper; fleet · 3. intentional
- All of the 46 GW from other entities will come from SMRs. Several technologies and institutional models are envisaged.
- An SMR is always a fast, sodium-cooled reactor. SMR describes size and construction; India's are water-cooled.
- As of November 2026, the SHANTI Act's private-participation provisions are fully in force. Draft rules were out for consultation; the Act awaits commencement.
- A 5 MWth reactor generates 5 MW of electricity. MWth is heat; electrical output would be roughly a third.
1. False: Several technologies and institutional models are envisaged. 2. False: SMR describes size and construction; India's are water-cooled. 3. False: Draft rules were out for consultation; the Act awaits commencement. 4. False: MWth is heat; electrical output would be roughly a third.
"Draft SHANTI rules propose a single licence for a plant's whole life." (a) Which laws did the Act replace? (b) Why does private participation matter for 100 GW? (c) Is the Act in force? (d) What changed on supplier liability?
(a) The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the CLND Act, 2010. (b) About 46 GW is expected from entities other than NPCIL. (c) Not yet; enactment and commencement are different. (d) Recourse against suppliers limited to written contracts or intentional acts.
With reference to India's small modular reactor programme, consider the following statements:
- The Bharat Small Modular Reactor (BSMR-200) is a pressurised water reactor design.
- The High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor being developed by BARC is intended mainly to supply process heat, including for hydrogen production.
- All small modular reactors are fast breeder reactors cooled by liquid sodium.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Answer: (b). "SMR" describes size and modular construction; India's own BSMR-200 and SMR-55 are water-cooled.
What it tests: SMR as a category, not a technology.
With reference to the SHANTI Act, 2025, consider the following statements:
- It repealed the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.
- It retains a single flat cap on operator liability of ₹1,500 crore for all installations.
- It gives statutory status to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Answer: (b). The flat ₹1,500 crore cap was the CLND Act's; the SHANTI Act grades operator liability by installation.
What it tests: old law versus new law.
Which one of the following is the main reason nuclear power is described as suitable for "baseload" supply?
Answer: (b). High, steady output is what baseload means. The other options are false for India.
What it tests: the reasoning behind the most common claim about nuclear power.
Is India's target of 100 GW of nuclear power by 2047 feasible?
Points to include: Strengths: fleet-mode 700 MWe PHWRs, PFBR, Kudankulam expansion, SHANTI, new uranium supply. Limits: never built this fast, high capital cost, component manufacturing, fuel for a tenfold fleet, rules pending. Feasible only if execution, finance and regulation improve together.
What role can small modular reactors play in India's energy transition?
Points to include: Captive power for industry, reuse of retiring coal sites, staged investment, process heat and hydrogen; but costs and schedules are unproven and India's designs are at demonstration stage, so SMRs supplement large reactors.
Why was supplier liability a barrier, and how does the SHANTI Act address it?
Points to include: The CLND Act let operators recover damages from suppliers for faulty equipment, unlike international practice, so foreign suppliers hesitated; SHANTI limits recourse to written contracts or intentional acts and grades operator liability.
Examine whether India's target of 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 is achievable. What role can small modular reactors play?
- Introduction: 8.78 GW and about 3% of electricity in 2026; about 22 GW by 2031–32 from projects under way; 100 GW by 2047 (NPCIL about 54 GW, others about 46 GW).
- Strengths: indigenous 700 MWe PHWRs now built in fleet mode; PFBR critical; Kudankulam expansion; the SHANTI Act opening the sector; uranium imports now including Australia.
- Constraints: India has never added capacity at the required pace; high capital cost and long construction; component manufacturing; fuel for a tenfold fleet; regulatory capacity; land and public acceptance; SHANTI rules still being finalised.
- SMRs: factory manufacture, staged investment, captive power and coal-site repurposing; but unproven cost and schedule worldwide, and India's designs are only at the demonstration stage. Useful as a second prong, not the main source of the 100 GW.
- Conclusion: achievable only if execution, finance and regulation improve together; the 2031–32 milestone is the first real test.
The next question All of this is fission. Is there another way to get energy from the nucleus, the one that powers the Sun?